The essay therefore recommends with specific interest in the African traditional thought systems, that rather than debating the scientific, rational, or logical nature of these explanatory models, each mode of thought should see this period of crisis or scientific revolution as a call to develop a new paradigm that is more effective in understanding and dealing with current challenges specifically as experienced in the African continent.The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a book about the history of science by philosopher Thomas S. Their coming in contact with each other simply results in a period of crisis where these unchallenged principles were challenged. When interpreted in this sense, we realize that Western science and African traditional thought operate some form of normal science, having their different sets of unchallenged principles that give rise to their paradigmatic schema. This essay attempts to show that the tension and protracted debate among scholars need not arise when these two modes of explanation are understood and interpreted in the light of Thomas Kuhn’s conception of science as incommensurables. This tension has often been left unresolved with some scholars (often referred to as Eurocentric scholars) arguing for the aforementioned claim while others denying it arguing that both modes of thought are rational and logical in their context of use. Different scholars have therefore been engaged in a heated and protracted debate as to whether there are justificatory grounds for or against the claim that the Western explanatory model is scientific, logical, coherent and rational while African traditional thought is non-scientific, mystical, illogical and irrational. As forms of defence of African traditional thought systems, scholars like Peter Winch, Desmond Tutu, and Placide Tempel, were foremost, advocating that logicality is inherently characteristic of the African explanatory models. It led to the judgment of the former by the latter as mystical, superstitious, illogical (to some authors pre-logical) and unscientific. The late 19th and early 20th centuries saw the challenging of African traditional thought systems by Western models than has ever been documented. It concludes by raising a number of questions arising from the recent literature. This paper addresses these questions by discussing Kuhn’s conception of scientific revolutions, examining the intellectual history of psychological authoritarianism, and exploring the extent to which the latter conforms to the pattern presented by Kuhn. The final question addresses the possible significant lines of psychology and political science research that the findings of this sub-field suggest. The second is whether the eighty years of research into this sub-field provides a sufficient basis for drawing well corroborated inferences about its characteristics, and if so, what substantive conclusions can be drawn from them. The first question is whether the intellectual history of this particularly extensive and intensive cross-disciplinary sub-field of social and political psychology bears any significant relationship to Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions, and if so, to what extent. This paper addresses three questions about psychological authoritarianism via a critical discussion of key texts in the literature. A closer look at Bohm's philosophical commitments highlights the ways in which his theory of quantum mechanics is non-classical and does not offer a way to avoid all 'quantum weirdness'. In particular, I argue that Bohm was never strongly committed to determinism and was a realist in some ways but not in others. I reject the idea that Bohm's early work can be described as mechanist, determinist, and realist, in contrast to his later writings, and argue that there is in fact a strong continuity between his work on quantum mechanics from the early 1950s and his later, more speculative writings. This paper aims to explain this discrepancy between the ways in which Bohm's work on quantum mechanics has been received and the way in which Bohm himself presented it. In later years, he moved more and more towards speculative and mystical directions. In response, Bohm emphasized the progressiveness of his approach, and even turned the accusation of classicality around by arguing that he wanted to move beyond classical elements still inherent in orthodox quantum mechanics. When David Bohm published his alternative theory of quantum mechanics in 1952, it was not received well a recurring criticism was that it formed a reactionary attempt to return to classical physics.
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